The search for the causes of diseases and the development of approaches to disease prevention based on a knowledge of these is a major preoccupation of modern epidemiology. Mervyn Susser has recently traced the evolution of criteria for deciding whether an observed association between a factor and a disease arises from an underlying causal link.' He highlights the pragmatic orientation of epidemiologists towards the combined task of contributing to the scientific understanding of disease causation, and of developing a sound base of public health technology from which to prevent its development. Reflecting this twofold focus, Sander Greenland2 has suggested that there may be differences in the standards of data and rules of inference appropriate to furthering scientific advancement on the one hand and informing public health decision making on the other, while others see public health interventions as potentially providing quasi-experimental evidence to support or refute causal hypotheses. 3 Susser describes a broad consensus over criteria for deciding causes epidemiology,7 and that it is possible, using a Bayesian approach, to assess when belief in a causal hypothesis may be deemed rational. 2 In this paper I wish to suggest that while the preoccupation with Popper has proved valuable in re-emphasising the need to underpin empirical study with clearly defined hypotheses, it has also focussed epidemiological thinking about causes too exclusively on unresolved questions of logic, leaving entirely unanalysed the notions both of causation and of disease which are central to all branches of medical science. My aim is to show that even a preliminary analysis of what we mean by causation and disease can provide important clues as to how we might go about deciding causes, and defines for epidemiology a rich and vital role both within the wider endeavour of medical science and in informing public health decision making. . Should anyone leave this instance and pretend to define a cause by saying it is something productive of another 'tis evident he would say nothing. . Can he give any definition of it that will not be the same with that of causation?" and later "It shall therefore be allowed for a moment that the production of one object by another in any one instance implies a power (of production). But it already having been proved that the power lies not in the sensible qualities of the cause; and there being nothing but the sensible qualities present to us; I ask why in other instances you presume that the same power still exists merely upon the appearance of these qualities. (1) Association -a causal factor must occur in regular association with its effect.
(2) Time sequence -a causal factor must have existential priority over its effect.
(3) Direction -the occurrence of the effect is consequent upon (produced by) the occurrence of the cause. For Susser establishing direction is the "crux of the difficulties in making a valid causal inference". While he has probably gone further than any other epidemiologist in confronting the ontological aspects of causation, at the end he sidesteps the issue of what direction is or how it may be known. Consequently, he fails to give sufficient emphasis to knowledge of the process through which causes produce their effects. It will be shown below that Susser's three properties of causation can be derived from a more fundamental analysis of the ontology of causation.
The ontology of causation In his realist account, Mario Bunge has identified causation as a particular category of determination. Determination is taken to mean a "way of becoming" which is characterised by the principles of lawfulness and productivity.-By lawfulnzess he means that "events take place (are determined) in accordance with a set of objective laws, whether we know the laws or not". By productivity he means the "ancient principle according to which nothing comes out of nothing or passes into nothing".
According to this view causation represents a way of becoming, and requires that productivity is a real characteristic of real things.
It is necessary to expand a little on what is meant by a law in the above. Realist theories of science have tended to distinguish between laws and law statements. Bunge uses the term laws, to refer to the regular patterns of being and becoming which are taken to be objectively real. Laws2 refer to our conceptual reconstructions of laws, or verbal statements of these. Roy Bhaskar has drawn the same distinction with his notions of the intransitive and transitive objects of scientific knowledge. In this paper I shall use the word "laws" to mean laws,.
If we accept Bunge's view of the real nature of causation, then Susser's "properties of causes" follow directly. A cause will be observed to be associated with its effect where observation is adequate in resolution and duration, since the production is regular in its accordance with laws. A cause is unable to produce its effect before it exists itself and is therefore, by definition, existentially prior to it. The productive nature of the relation secures direction or asymmetry.
The preceding discussion has led us to the view that causation describes a way of becoming, characterised by its regularity, and productivity. We must next examine the ontological assumptions of our notions of disease and pathogenesis.
The ontology of disease and pathogenesis Hippocratic/Galenic medicine believed that diseases were imbalances of "humours",18 specific to individuals, and were manifest in the realm of the observable only by the clinical features. The notion that diseases were specific entities with real physical existence was developed much later by Sydenham and Baglivi in the 17th century,'9 and formalised by the Paris pathologists20 in the 18th century, thus providing the foundation for our modern ontology of disease. The profound reductionism and materialism of this ontology is witnessed by the introduction to the Muir's standard textbook of pathology for medical students.2' "Disease may be defined as any abnormal variation in structure or function of any part of the body ... disease does not occur spontaneously, but only as the consequence of some abnormality induced in the cells of the body by specific causal factors."
This quotation defines an ontology of disease (and hints at an ontology of pathogenesis) in terms of the body's material elements and its material processes. This ontology has been termed "scientific materialism" by Alfred North Whitehead22 and has dominated both the biological and physical sciences since the abandonment of vitalism. According to this view, the organ, tissues, and cellular systems of the body, in common with all other things, are composed of an "irreducible brute matter or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations".22 The physiological processes and mechanisms which comprise the behaviour of body systems over time are similarly determined by the laws governing the behaviour of brute matter. Thus, pathogenesis is taken to be nothing more than the interaction between physiological processes/mechanisms and any influences which may impinge upon them; and diseases represent the end stages of these processes.
Scientific materialism thus provides a unifying ontological framework within which can be integrated not only the mechanisms governing living and dead matter, but also those governing what Susser2' has called the different systems and levels of organisation of living things. Although scientific materialism is consistent, well worked out, and widely accepted, I do not believe it is the only ontological framework that might plausibly achieve such an integration. As Joseph Needham has suggested24: "Mechanists do not say that nothing is true or intelligible unless expressed in physico chemical terms. . . what they do say is that the processes of living matter are subject to the same laws that govern processes in dead matter."
It seems possible that other ontologies may, in the future, take hold of the scientific imagination, and in time supercede scientific materialism as the dominant influence. Candidates might include the consistent organic mechanism elaborated by Whitehead and his followers,25 which places the organism rather than brute matter at the foundation of real existence. A discussion of the relative merits of different ontologies is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, having identified scientific materialism as the ontology which currently dominates our notions of disease and pathogenesis, I will now try to outline a realist principle of disease causation within this ontology, and to draw out its implications for epidemiology. My argument will, nonetheless, be seen to hold in its general form whatever monistic ontology we might adopt, providing that it is realist in attitude.
A causal principle for epidemiology Having analysed the ontological content of the notions of causation, disease, and pathogenesis, we are in a position to formulate a consistent description of what we understand by a cause of a disease? Let us first consider the definitions of two of the most thoughtful writers on the subject. Mervyn Susserl (p 637) has recently suggested the following: "A determinant is any factor which affects an outcome (disease)."
A similar definition has been propounded by Kenneth Rothman26 as:
"An event, condition or characteristic which plays an essential role in producing an occurrence of the disease."
Both these definitions are open to the charge of circularity levelled by Hume in the first of the quotations given above.'6 Susser defines a determinant as that which affects an outcome; which is just another way of saying that it determines it. Similarly, Rothman defines a cause as that which produces the disease, where clearly the notion of production entails the notion of causation. Does our ontological analysis offer us any way out of this trap? I have outlined above the generally accepted scientific materialist ontological model for pathogenesis. Starting from this model I would suggest:
A cause of a disease is any factor in whose presence the general laws according to which a biological process or mechanism evolves over time determine that its evolution will be towards the abnormal state which the disease represents.
It will be immediately apparent that this formulation suffers problems of circularity similar to those previously considered. However, there is an important difference. Where previously the affecting or producing was attributed to the cause itself, in the latter statement it is attributed to laws with a higher degree of generality. This point is of considerable importance. In effect, it places the status of the association between factor and disease, not at the level of an induction from repeated observations, but as a deducible particular instance of more general laws of nature. It is notable that this encompassing of particular hypotheses within more general ones is held by Popper to be a fundamental characteristic of a progressive science."
It is clear that our formulation, as it stands, allows as causes only factors which are directly involved in biological mechanisms. According to the usual epidemiological model, the interaction between elements of the causal agent, the host, and the environment sets up a process whose final common pathway represents the disease state. A restriction of the notion of cause to factors involved in this final pathway might be deemed to place an arbitrary and unnecessary constraint upon both the explanatory power of epidemiology and its ability to contribute to the rational design of public health interventions. It is precisely here that the adoption of an ontological position becomes important. The agent, host, and environment are posited as three separate domains within the model, precisely because at the empirical level they represent different systems and levels of organisation. However, in order that they should interact they must have a common ontological status. Viewed from the scientific materialist standpoint, this status is that they comprise more or less complex systems of material processes. The elaboration of causal chains and networks constructed within this ontology is the business of all those areas of medical science which are concerned with elucidating the causation of disease.
Epistemological consequences of a realist view of causation A realist scientific ontology requires not only that the things which are the objects of science exist and that they share the same sort of existence, but also that the laws governing change also exist in the sense of being immanent in the things themselves. It is by virtue of this realist ontology that we can integrate different phenomenal levels of organisation. Because both the individual and his gut partake of the same kind of existence we can explain his report of dyspepsia and epigastric pain by describing the ulceration of his stomach. Similarly, the assumption that both populations and individuals partake of the same kind of existence underlies the epidemiologist's conviction that the study of populations can tell us something about the determination of disease in an individual. In what follows, the adoption of a realist ontology will be seen to have particular consequences for the work of the epidemiologist.
A REALIST VIEW INTEGRATES EPIDEMIOLOGY WITH BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE
The adoption of the scientific materialist ontology permits the fruitful integration of epidemiology and basic medical science. It It is very difficult to see how the current widely held hypothesis that certain genetic types of HPV cause cancer of the cervix could have been arrived at without the constant cross-fertilisation between epidemiological and biological approaches to the disease. The example is by no means unique, but rather has been a general feature of the elucidation of the determinants of disease in human populations, and Susser has provided many examples in his book.24
THE REALIST VIEW ASSISTS IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL CONFOUNDERS
When observational studies report that a putative causal factor is associated with a disease, the possibility that the association has arisen through confounding must be considered. Attempts to exclude the effects of confounding factors from the associations described by observational studies require their measurement and control, either through matched designs, or the stratified analysis of study results.3839 A central problem with this strategy is that to measure a potential confounder in the first place, the investigator must know in advance that, potentially, it is independently associated with occurrence of the disease. But how can she have this prior knowledge?
Broadly applicable demographic factors such as age and social class are almost universally considered as potential confounders. Both of these factors are associated with marked variation in the incidence of many diseases. In the case of age this reflects both the fact that older age allows chronicity of harmful exposures and an appeal to the notion, whether or not cast in Darwinian terms, that biological systems "wear out". In the case of social class this confounding is generally explained by the clustering of harmful exposures towards one or other end of the class scale. Such implicit assumptions are pointers to the three principal ways in which the more specific potential confounders are identified for the purposes of design of observational studies.
Firstly, factors known through previous epidemiological investigation to be associated with the disease represent obvious candidates. Secondly, factors known to be associated with the putative cause may be deemed worthy of measurement. Thirdly, factors which are known to, or which theory suggests may, impinge on the mechanisms involved in pathogenesis, should be considered as potential confounders. Furthermore, where factors previously associated with the disease or the putative cause are also thought to impinge on pathogenesis, then their candidacy as confounders is strengthened.
In the previous section I have highlighted the constant cross-fertilisation between epidemiological and pathological approaches in explaining the causes of disease. In this section it has become clear that a similar process is also crucial to the control of confounding factors, because an understanding of the mechanisms of pathogenesis is of central importance to their successful identification. Nonetheless, in deciding causation from associations found in the results of observational studies we can never be sure that we have not failed adequately to control for an important confounder. This has led some epidemiologists to the view that only experimental studies in which there is an intervention to change "exposure" to a factor should claim to address the question of whether that factor is causal."' There are two problems with this view. Firstly, the ability of such studies to isolate experimentally induced variation in the exposure from concomitant variation in any confounders will entirely depend on the origin of the putative cause/confounder association.' Secondly, in many intervention studies, adequate definition of change in exposure in both intervention and control groups may be difficult to achieve.
THE REALIST VIEW ALLOWS A COHERENT ANALYSIS OF CAUSAL INTERACTION IN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES
It has long been acknowledged that factors which play a role in the pathogenesis of a disease are often not in themselves necessary for the development of disease, nor in most cases sufficient.' This understanding has been implicit in the construction of the commonly used "effect measures" which express the strength of associations between factors and diseases, and also in attempts to refine these measures to serve the analysis of the effects of multiple causation in the results of observational studies: the analysis of interaction. Cooping4l has suggested that interest in the problem of interaction has grown with a shift in the focus of epidemiology from implicating factors in the causation of diseases towards assessment of their contribution to the overall disease problem. Discussion has turned around ways of deriving an expression for the relative risk for disease associated with exposure to one or more particular factors jointly, in terms of the relative risks associated with those factors individually, where they act through the same pathogenetic pathway to cause the disease.
In debating this problem most authors have agreed with Rothman's contention25 that the analysis of interaction between causal factors, if it is not to be entirely arbitrary, must be founded upon the notion that this interaction occurs through their involvement in the same pathogenetic mechanism. statements about the causes of diseases from the results of epidemiological studies has emphasised a role for epidemiology in directing public health decision making which it cannot sustain alone. I have proposed a complementary view based on an analysis of the ontology of disease and causation in which epidemiology is characterised as a basic medical science, standing integrated with other basic medical sciences and progressing through a rich process of cross-fertilisation with these other disciplines. In this view medical science as a whole is brought to bear on the problem of deciding causes, and provides a key element to the foundations of rational public health decision making as it relates to disease prevention.
The ontology of scientific materialism, which is implicit in our modern notions of both disease and causation, offers us one framework within which we can hope to untangle the complex web of events occurring at the levels of the agent, host, and environment which determine the development of diseases. Emphasis on the real basis of disease causation serves us in a number of important ways. It helps us to identify research questions which may be addressed by epidemiological observation and allows that epidemiological observation suggest pathogenetic mechanisms which might be investigated by basic medical scientists. It provides us with a rational basis from which to identify potential confounding and effect modifying factors for which to control in epidemiological studies. It requires that statements about the causation of diseases be cast in terms of physical laws and scientific hypotheses of more general application in the physical world.
The consistent association between a factor and a disease occurring in correct time order in observational studies, where bias has been minimised, suggests a causal or confounded relationship. A strong relationship which persists in the face of strenuous attempts to control confounding in observational studies and through intervention studies shifts the balance towards causation. A knowledge of the mechanisms of pathogenesis of the disease, and the demonstration that a factor will materially influence these mechanisms through the material laws which govern them, adds further to our confidence in causation. Hill's criteria of biological gradient, plausibility, and coherence shift the epidemiologist's attention towards the real material basis of disease causation. Where there is evidence, either from basic medical science or epidemiology of causation, policy makers will consider whether the use of public health technology to modify the distribution of the factor or to identify those exposed might be possible and appropriate. Where there is both of these, properly designed public health programmes might certainly be expected to yield some success, and controlled trials, where ethical, are likely to be the best way to assess their effectiveness. 
